"But Transport Secretary Ray LaHood has warned 787s will not fly again until he is "1,000% sure" they are safe."
We'll see.
I presume that means Never as 1000% is just not possible. It is disgustling what these idiots are saying... no real intelligence. Transport can never be 100% safe, we can only be vigilant.
The people using airplanes deserve overseers that are less interested in sound bites and more able to be factual.
Boeings chief engineer, Mike Sinnett, said Jan. 9 that the batteries were designed so that failure of one cell wouldnt cascade to the others, and that the plane would be safe even if it did. He said there had been no issues with the battery cells over 1.3 million operating hours.
Wow.
The reports I read said the failure was NOT as contained as they expected/predicted, so clearly their modeling was optimistic.
So they certainly do need to (re) work on their Containment design - and this cannot be done with band-aids, as once a cell is out of control, the smartest controller in the world cannot cool it.
"over 1.3 million operating hours." ?? is this his attempt to spin a better line than one plane in 50 in a few short months
Clearly, the cells have NOT operated for over 1.3 million hours, so one hopes he was miss-quoted on the cell-hours
Mr Sinnett is talking as a politician. He won't be saying what Boeing have used these batteries for or even tested for.
Given how new this chemistry is for aviation use, the figures he'll be quoting will be verbatim from the battery maker's (GS Yuasa) data, ie: what GS Yuasa have done in their lab simulations of flight time.
Good joke about the modelling. Yeah, right. They've just read the specs and stuffed the cells in a box. The fact that Boeing thought using Lithium Cobalt was an okay chemistry says a tremendous amount about their naivety.
I suspect there are lots of insights into why these cells failed, but the NTSB is not allowed to offer a design or engineering opinion. The FAA might do some of that.
But the truth is there is an under-current that American industry is fully committed to make lithium cells work in aviation. One might consider that their are some hidden aspects, such as the still existant Tri-lateral Commission that is trying to project the future of Japanese and American industrial interest.
As I've read somewhere, in the past, airplanes were using silver oxide(?) batteries, since they are closer in weight to lithium, and closer in safety to nicd.
Good engineering is generic and doesn't care who makes what or which country is involved, but business and politic go hand in hand to seek a different result.
Boeing versus Airbus is a big part of the decision making process. Lithium Cobalt is a known fire-hazard lithium cell, so it is hard to ignore that somebody was either not fully aware, or just chose to deny the existing issue. Airbus has come out publicly and stated they won't fly with lithium until they are 100% sure. So a line was drawn in the sand, and Boeing has responded by saying they are staying with lithium and the individual cells will have insulation between them in the future.
My sense is that the Boeing corporate culture is feeling a bit locked in and flat footed. The US military has a big commitment to lithium cells and Boeing is a military contractor.
In any event, I suspect the NTSB and the FAA will assure that the 787 is safe to fly even if Boeing uses lithium cells. It may be costly and unpleasant for Boeing, but it will be safe.
Since lithium metal is combustible in air above a certain temperature AND in these Lithium Cobalt cells the electrolyte provides an oxidant similar to air when a thermal breakdown begins, liquid cooling would likely be a very wise move.
This is especially an issue when the plane sits on the tarmac and runs for long periods. Heat might accumulate. When flying, the outside temperature is so cold that it is easy to tap the outside ambient temperature with a heat exchanger to keep the batteries in a safe thermal range.
Of course, they might shift to a safer lithium technology, such as LiFePO4 and maybe skip the liquid cooling.
It seems we have too many areonautic, mechanical, and electrical engineers in play. One good chemical engineer would point out that batteries are chemical reaction and chemical reactions always inculde a significant endo-thermic or exo-thermic element that has to be managed.
Well, I just seen the latest on this saga. Titled "Broken Dreams: The Boeing 787"
It gives a little more history that brings the Boeing situation into better focus. And, yes, the batteries are very much a tiny tip of the iceberg. I'm feeling the avoid-flying-altogether syndrome.
Bear in mind the origins of this so-called "documentary". But that's all I'll say about that, because it's probably too political for this forum.
Do check out the videos of the 787 at the 2014 Farnborough Airshow. I'm one of those people that tends to believe that, in general if something looks right it probably is - and that's a beautiful airplane.
Bear in mind the origins of this so-called "documentary". But that's all I'll say about that, because it's probably too political for this forum.
Do check out the videos of the 787 at the 2014 Farnborough Airshow. I'm one of those people that tends to believe that, in general if something looks right it probably is - and that's a beautiful airplane.
When arbitrary deadlines are more important than thoroughness, and no-one is responsible for the work (as it was assigned to contractors rather than employees), risk increases.
Some quality people (process folks) say the rule of thumb is to NOT allow loved ones to fly the 787 until the version 2, the version AFTER the major incident (yet to transpire).
Beauty is only skin deep, but an impact crater goes all the way to the bottom. The risk is only one in the number of 787's flying, but its too great to risk my kids.
When arbitrary deadlines are more important than thoroughness, and no-one is responsible for the work (as it was assigned to contractors rather than employees), risk increases.
Some quality people (process folks) say the rule of thumb is to NOT allow loved ones to fly the 787 until the version 2, the version AFTER the major incident (yet to transpire).
Beauty is only skin deep, but an impact crater goes all the way to the bottom. The risk is only one in the number of 787's flying, but its too great to risk my kids.
I wouldn't want to risk my kids or my own life flying on it. Fortunately none of us have to fly too often now.
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It seems we have too many areonautic, mechanical, and electrical engineers in play. One good chemical engineer would point out that batteries are chemical reaction and chemical reactions always inculde a significant endo-thermic or exo-thermic element that has to be managed.
An excellent point. Technology and engineering has become so complex that specialization is an absolute necessity. At the same time projects now involve so many areas of technology that interactions between those areas need to be taken into considerations. Seems like a generalist is needed to determine what specialists are needed and to manage the overall interactions.
I was on the team testing the fly-by-wire software of the Primary Flight Computers of the 777. We were not part of Boeing but a sub-contractor who built both the software and hardware.
I really don't want to get into all the short cuts our management tried to make there.
I am very proud of the team, and myself, that we did fight very hard to not let anything get hidden "under the rug". Not only were we acutely aware of the safety critical nature of that task but there is a certain geek pride in being able to say "Ha! I found a bug in your stupid code".
One bug I found was actually a bug in the requirements from Boeing. After much debate about how that feature should work it did not get resolved until the test pilot hit the problem on the second or third flight and demanded it get fixed. In the way that I had suggested. Which is odd because I know nothing about aircraft and aerodynamics. I have no idea what they were thinking when they spec'ed it wrongly.
I like to think that this attitude exists in the engineers building all the other parts of such a project.
I was on the team testing the fly-by-wire software of the Primary Flight Computers of the 777. We were not part of Boeing but a sub-contractor who built both the software and hardware.
I really don't want to get into all the short cuts our management tried to make there.
I am very proud of the team, and myself, that we did fight very hard to not let anything get hidden "under the rug". Not only were we acutely aware of the safety critical nature of that task but there is a certain geek pride in being able to say "Ha! I found a bug in your stupid code".
One bug I found was actually a bug in the requirements from Boeing. After much debate about how that feature should work it did not get resolved until the test pilot hit the problem on the second or third flight and demanded it get fixed. In the way that I had suggested. Which is odd because I know nothing about aircraft and aerodynamics. I have no idea what they were thinking when they spec'ed it wrongly.
I like to think that this attitude exists in the engineers building all the other parts of such a project.
I want to thank you on the behalf of everyone who flies...your insistence for doing it right has saved countless lives.
FWIW...the cartoon Dilbert is reality in engineering.
With any new development, management...with their families...should be required to fly the new technology...they would take quality requirements much more serious.
I suspect their families do fly... more often than you or I.
The reality is that safety culture has to evolve along with technological innovation. I'd much rather have Boeing do what they are doing than someone else. They are deeply aware of their responsibility to get things right. After all, they wouldn't be what they are today without the De Havalland Comet. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/De_Havilland_Comet
The reality is that safety culture has to evolve along with technological innovation. I'd much rather have Boeing do what they are doing than someone else. They are deeply aware of their responsibility to get things right.
It only takes one top level decision to change objective then ... slowly but surely the skills, knowledge, culture and even official processes get destroyed from the inside out. Boeing made that decision in the mid-1990's. And, a little surprisingly, hasn't been corrected to this day.
There is something very rotten happening that Boeing has become a casualty of.
I can't help but wonder if this is a hazard of today's corporate culture, today's technological advancement culture, or just today's culture.
Every project gains its own momentum, and both safety and quality are negative feedback to that. The concerns are real if the feedback is cut out or dampened. Somebody has to assure that its fidelity is good, but how?
In some instance, I fear that prosperity actually undermines vigillance and negligent greed kicks in as everyone wants to get rich. Economic downturns may return to better values.
I can't help but wonder if this is a hazard of today's corporate culture, today's technological advancement culture, or just today's culture.
Absolutely not, you can probably step all the way back to ancient Greece and find similar exploitation every step of the way. Tax and governments were born of this issue. Without enforced regulation, it becomes a race to the bottom.
Part of the rot is clearly the existing system of regulation has become ineffective/corrupt/sick, take your pick.
Every project gains its own momentum, and both safety and quality are negative feedback to that. The concerns are real if the feedback is cut out or dampened. Somebody has to assure that its fidelity is good, but how?
One way that comes to mind, aside from tons of detailed regulations, is transparency plus a public reviewable mission statement that doesn't put profit first. With one enforceable regulation - any and all top brass can be criminalised for failing that mission. And of course, whistle-blowing has to be acceptable, including for top-secret disclosures.
The catch with this idea is that secrets will virtually be impossible. Personally, I don't see this is too big an ask either. After all, they are already asking us to give up our privacy. I'll give up my privacy when businesses and governments are willing to give up their secrets!
Well, what I have learned about flying commercially in Asia is that flying an American carrier is far safer than the local carriers, excepting Japan and maybe Singapore.
In contrast to the rest of the world, the USA still tries harder to be sure you arrive safely where you want to go... even if it means grounding a fleet of airplanes.
If you are ever in S.E. Asia, never go beyond the boarding gate if there is an incoming or outgoing typhoon. We just had another incident where the pilots took off around typhoon weather and there were no survivors. In the past 20 years I think about half of the crashes have had typhoon weather involved.. and the investigations seem to say it is all pilot error as they don't have to go. (The truth is that they feel they do have to go to keep their jobs.)
There is a phrase I heard recently - "Misery is easy, happiness you have work at." It was intended as a personal thought/comment but in some ways I feel it's oh so very applicable as a societal comment also.
(The truth is that they feel they do have to go to keep their jobs.)
Must be a pretty heavy penalty for arriving late as well. Most aircraft have a rated "maneuvering speed" where the plane will stall before the wings break off. Supposed to stay under that speed if rough weather is nearby.
I haven't heard a peep of new info on the 787 battery fires. Has anyone found new info? Should have had some results by now if Boeing put a couple batteries on a life tester that could simulate all of the flight conditions. (even the air pressure changes)
It just has to simulate an overcharge condition and it's all over. They should not ever use the LiCoO2 chemistry. Not now nor in the future.
It is only good for things you can easily walk, or run, away from. The Tesla cars are a testament to the extreme lengths of engineering one has to go to to manage this chemistry. I think it would be fair to say the overriding desire for energy density was the reason why Tesla would have tackled the risk.
Comments
"But Transport Secretary Ray LaHood has warned 787s will not fly again until he is "1,000% sure" they are safe."
We'll see.
I presume that means Never as 1000% is just not possible. It is disgustling what these idiots are saying... no real intelligence. Transport can never be 100% safe, we can only be vigilant.
The people using airplanes deserve overseers that are less interested in sound bites and more able to be factual.
http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/2013/boeing_787/interim_report_B787_3-7-13.pdf
Wow.
The reports I read said the failure was NOT as contained as they expected/predicted, so clearly their modeling was optimistic.
So they certainly do need to (re) work on their Containment design - and this cannot be done with band-aids, as once a cell is out of control, the smartest controller in the world cannot cool it.
"over 1.3 million operating hours." ?? is this his attempt to spin a better line than one plane in 50 in a few short months
Clearly, the cells have NOT operated for over 1.3 million hours, so one hopes he was miss-quoted on the cell-hours
Given how new this chemistry is for aviation use, the figures he'll be quoting will be verbatim from the battery maker's (GS Yuasa) data, ie: what GS Yuasa have done in their lab simulations of flight time.
Good joke about the modelling. Yeah, right. They've just read the specs and stuffed the cells in a box. The fact that Boeing thought using Lithium Cobalt was an okay chemistry says a tremendous amount about their naivety.
I suspect there are lots of insights into why these cells failed, but the NTSB is not allowed to offer a design or engineering opinion. The FAA might do some of that.
But the truth is there is an under-current that American industry is fully committed to make lithium cells work in aviation. One might consider that their are some hidden aspects, such as the still existant Tri-lateral Commission that is trying to project the future of Japanese and American industrial interest.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trilateral_Commission
Boeing versus Airbus is a big part of the decision making process. Lithium Cobalt is a known fire-hazard lithium cell, so it is hard to ignore that somebody was either not fully aware, or just chose to deny the existing issue. Airbus has come out publicly and stated they won't fly with lithium until they are 100% sure. So a line was drawn in the sand, and Boeing has responded by saying they are staying with lithium and the individual cells will have insulation between them in the future.
My sense is that the Boeing corporate culture is feeling a bit locked in and flat footed. The US military has a big commitment to lithium cells and Boeing is a military contractor.
In any event, I suspect the NTSB and the FAA will assure that the 787 is safe to fly even if Boeing uses lithium cells. It may be costly and unpleasant for Boeing, but it will be safe.
Liquid cooling has been suggested. Think it needs one more thing that can go wrong?
Its easy to to make things more complex. Its much harder to make them simple.
This is especially an issue when the plane sits on the tarmac and runs for long periods. Heat might accumulate. When flying, the outside temperature is so cold that it is easy to tap the outside ambient temperature with a heat exchanger to keep the batteries in a safe thermal range.
Of course, they might shift to a safer lithium technology, such as LiFePO4 and maybe skip the liquid cooling.
It seems we have too many areonautic, mechanical, and electrical engineers in play. One good chemical engineer would point out that batteries are chemical reaction and chemical reactions always inculde a significant endo-thermic or exo-thermic element that has to be managed.
It gives a little more history that brings the Boeing situation into better focus. And, yes, the batteries are very much a tiny tip of the iceberg. I'm feeling the avoid-flying-altogether syndrome.
Do check out the videos of the 787 at the 2014 Farnborough Airshow. I'm one of those people that tends to believe that, in general if something looks right it probably is - and that's a beautiful airplane.
When arbitrary deadlines are more important than thoroughness, and no-one is responsible for the work (as it was assigned to contractors rather than employees), risk increases.
Some quality people (process folks) say the rule of thumb is to NOT allow loved ones to fly the 787 until the version 2, the version AFTER the major incident (yet to transpire).
Beauty is only skin deep, but an impact crater goes all the way to the bottom. The risk is only one in the number of 787's flying, but its too great to risk my kids.
I wouldn't want to risk my kids or my own life flying on it. Fortunately none of us have to fly too often now.
An excellent point. Technology and engineering has become so complex that specialization is an absolute necessity. At the same time projects now involve so many areas of technology that interactions between those areas need to be taken into considerations. Seems like a generalist is needed to determine what specialists are needed and to manage the overall interactions.
I was on the team testing the fly-by-wire software of the Primary Flight Computers of the 777. We were not part of Boeing but a sub-contractor who built both the software and hardware.
I really don't want to get into all the short cuts our management tried to make there.
I am very proud of the team, and myself, that we did fight very hard to not let anything get hidden "under the rug". Not only were we acutely aware of the safety critical nature of that task but there is a certain geek pride in being able to say "Ha! I found a bug in your stupid code".
One bug I found was actually a bug in the requirements from Boeing. After much debate about how that feature should work it did not get resolved until the test pilot hit the problem on the second or third flight and demanded it get fixed. In the way that I had suggested. Which is odd because I know nothing about aircraft and aerodynamics. I have no idea what they were thinking when they spec'ed it wrongly.
I like to think that this attitude exists in the engineers building all the other parts of such a project.
I want to thank you on the behalf of everyone who flies...your insistence for doing it right has saved countless lives.
FWIW...the cartoon Dilbert is reality in engineering.
The reality is that safety culture has to evolve along with technological innovation. I'd much rather have Boeing do what they are doing than someone else. They are deeply aware of their responsibility to get things right. After all, they wouldn't be what they are today without the De Havalland Comet. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/De_Havilland_Comet
It only takes one top level decision to change objective then ... slowly but surely the skills, knowledge, culture and even official processes get destroyed from the inside out. Boeing made that decision in the mid-1990's. And, a little surprisingly, hasn't been corrected to this day.
There is something very rotten happening that Boeing has become a casualty of.
Every project gains its own momentum, and both safety and quality are negative feedback to that. The concerns are real if the feedback is cut out or dampened. Somebody has to assure that its fidelity is good, but how?
In some instance, I fear that prosperity actually undermines vigillance and negligent greed kicks in as everyone wants to get rich. Economic downturns may return to better values.
Part of the rot is clearly the existing system of regulation has become ineffective/corrupt/sick, take your pick.
One way that comes to mind, aside from tons of detailed regulations, is transparency plus a public reviewable mission statement that doesn't put profit first. With one enforceable regulation - any and all top brass can be criminalised for failing that mission. And of course, whistle-blowing has to be acceptable, including for top-secret disclosures.
The catch with this idea is that secrets will virtually be impossible. Personally, I don't see this is too big an ask either. After all, they are already asking us to give up our privacy. I'll give up my privacy when businesses and governments are willing to give up their secrets!
In contrast to the rest of the world, the USA still tries harder to be sure you arrive safely where you want to go... even if it means grounding a fleet of airplanes.
If you are ever in S.E. Asia, never go beyond the boarding gate if there is an incoming or outgoing typhoon. We just had another incident where the pilots took off around typhoon weather and there were no survivors. In the past 20 years I think about half of the crashes have had typhoon weather involved.. and the investigations seem to say it is all pilot error as they don't have to go. (The truth is that they feel they do have to go to keep their jobs.)
A perfect example of why we end up with so many regulations. A company has to see it as a direct price tag before acting responsibly.
Must be a pretty heavy penalty for arriving late as well. Most aircraft have a rated "maneuvering speed" where the plane will stall before the wings break off. Supposed to stay under that speed if rough weather is nearby.
I haven't heard a peep of new info on the 787 battery fires. Has anyone found new info? Should have had some results by now if Boeing put a couple batteries on a life tester that could simulate all of the flight conditions. (even the air pressure changes)
Marty
It is only good for things you can easily walk, or run, away from. The Tesla cars are a testament to the extreme lengths of engineering one has to go to to manage this chemistry. I think it would be fair to say the overriding desire for energy density was the reason why Tesla would have tackled the risk.